9 May 2024, 17:30 (Room H-232)
Abstract: this paper will argue that philosophers working on fiction have paid insufficient attention to the distinction between representations and face-to-face encounters. This paper will sketch the relevant differences. There are three sets of implications all of which undermine the relevance of the fiction/non-fiction distinction within representations. First, the “standard” problems in the philosophy of fiction are simply part of these differences. Second, an account of what it is to engage with a representation pays no attention to the fiction/non-fiction distinction – nor, rather surprisingly, to the imagination. Third, the booksellers’ distinction between fiction and non-fiction can still be made, and the true/false distinction is left untouched.
About the speaker: go to https://www.open.ac.uk/people/dcm4
Co-organized with the Department of Philosophy: http://www.phil.bilkent.edu.tr/